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The Limitations of Regulatory Oversight on
Online Video
Jennifer Simpson*
If there are no fresh starts in history, if the future is made from fragments of
the past, then the discourse of entitlement in an information society will draw on
images of information that were produced in a society where information bore a
very different relationship to technology, to power, to wealth, a different relation-
ship even to our own bodies. To put it another way if history is collage, then we
need to look at the available picture, scissors, and paste.1
INTRODUCTION
To understand the current regulatory status of online video by the Canadian
Radio-Television and Telecommunication Commission (CRTC) one must appreci-
ate that it is a story not unlike that found on a mid-afternoon soap opera: glamorous
media and technology companies, essential to a melodramatic plot, are its players
who are in constant conflict with one another about the regulation of the medium.
For the audience as consumers the fate of online video is unclear, as there always
seems to be another episode of regulatory consideration. Online video, or what the
CRTC calls over-the-top (OTT), can take on many forms: from downloaded to
streaming video, and from short video clips to longer-format pieces such as feature
films. It is further differentiated from traditional television programming as content
is provided on websites and is made available solely through access to a broadband
Internet connection. Despite the need for a broadband connection, changes in hard-
ware technology mean that OTT content may be viewed through a variety of de-
vices including: a PC, mobile phone, handheld tablet, or even a traditional televi-
sion that uses external hardware to link to Internet services.
While online video has remained subject to the CRTC’s new media exemption
order2 its exempt status is continually reviewed by the Commission. Review hap-
pens regularly as the historic dialogue between the regulatory, traditional television
broadcasters, and Internet-based media companies shows. Key to these discussions
is the supposed threat that online video presents to the broadcaster’s business
model. During these regulatory episodes, the CRTC has stated that the new media
exemption order for online video providers exists because the current use of these
* BA (Hon) (Toronto), MSc (LSE), JD candidate at Western University. Many thanks to
Samuel Trosow, Jacob Glick, Catherine Middleton and anonymous peer reviewers for
their helpful comments. The author gratefully acknowledges support from the GRAND
NCE research network for assistance financing the writing of this paper.
1 James Boyle, Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Infor-
mation Society, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), at x.
2 CRTC, Broadcasting Regulatory Policy 2009-329: Review of Broadcasting in New Me-
dia (Ottawa: CRTC, 4 June 2009) online: CRTC
<http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2009/2009-329.htm> [Policy 2009-329].
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services by Canadians does not yet have “a negative impact on the ability of the
system to achieve the policy objectives of the Broadcasting Act.”3 Yet implicit in
statements by the CRTC about its interest in oversight of this sector, is that regula-
tion of online video content providers will likely occur at a future time when the
threat of online video exceeds is usefulness for the broadcasting industry. Little
discussion by the Commission, or the parties, focuses on whether it is appropriate
to regulate this form of media. In April 2012 the CRTC decided to delay its next
fact finding exercise on OTT, but stated it would continue to monitor developments
in the industry and launch another exercise at a future date when warranted.4
This paper will assess the current regulatory framework of online video and
argue that the regulation of online video by the CRTC is a treacherous endeavor as
it involves redefining essential elements found in broadcasting and telecommunica-
tions law in Canada. Regulatory action by the Commission may cause greater un-
certainty and discord in the law that governs communications. Further, current
“likeness” tests used by the CRTC to determine the aptness of entities for regula-
tion, including assessing threats to the regulated industry as well as similarities be-
tween new and traditional services, do not adequately reflect the regulatory man-
date of the Commission. In the discussion on how, or whether, online content such
as video should be regulated, the original underpinnings of the legal justification
for the regulation of broadcast or telecommunications entities is lost. It is hoped, by
reintroducing these justifications for regulation into the legal discourse, that the
difficulties of regulating online video can be seen.
Discussion in this paper focuses on the factors, attributes, and elements of
telecom and broadcast regulation in Canada. Part I of this study briefly outlines the
history of online video regulation in Canada to date. In Part II speculation as to
how online video might be regulated, based on prior decisions of the CRTC, is
presented. Part III considers the challenges of applying the Broadcasting Act to
new media entities in order to create a regulatory framework for online video. Part
IV looks at judicial decisions related to broadcast law that may be used to define
the nature of the service, and therefore limit the application of the Broadcasting Act
to specific types of technology. Part V examines the legal justification for the regu-
lation of broadcast and telecommunications in Canada, as well as in other countries
with similar regulatory frameworks, such as the United States. Finally, Part VI
presents various legal difficulties for justifying the regulation of online video as a
broadcast entity.
I. ONLINE VIDEO REGULATION IN CANADA
(a) First Impressions: 1999
With the growth in popularity of the Internet among Canadians beginning in
3 CRTC, Results of the fact-finding exercise on the over-the-top programming services
(Ottawa: CRTC, 2011) online: CRTC <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/publications/
reports/rp1110.htm> [Fact-Finding Results].
4 John Traversy (Secretary General), Commission Letter (Ottawa: CRTC, 16 April 2012)
online: CRTC <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2012/lb120416.htm>.
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the 1990s,5 the CRTC wished to bring clarity to the status of new media entities for
the purposes of regulation. This status was first considered by the CRTC in 1999.
In Public Notice CRTC 1999-84 New Media,6 the Commission first set out to de-
fine the nature of new media, its status in Canada, and the goals of regulation. At
that time the CRTC segmented various online digital technologies categorically for
the purposes of regulation under the Broadcasting Act.7 The Commission found
that online digital content might be termed broadcasting in cases where content
“consists only of audio, video, a combination of audio and video, or other visual
images including still images that do not consist predominantly of alphanumeric
text.”8 As well as excluding the possibility of regulating general web pages, the
Commission also decided not to include user-generated content in defining new
media.9
The 1999 policy document further outlines that the definitions of “broadcast-
ing” and “programming” in the Broadcasting Act are technologically neutral pro-
viding for the possibility of regulation.10 Despite OTT’s lack of transmission or
receiving device, the Commission held that the Broadcasting Act did not contem-
plate the use of any particular technology: 
Further, the Commission considers that the particular technology used for
the delivery of signals over the Internet cannot be determinative. Based on a
plain meaning of the word, and recognizing the intent that the definition be
technologically neutral, the Commission considers that the delivery of data
signals from an origination point (e.g. a host server) to a reception point
(e.g. an end-user’s apparatus) by means of the Internet involves the “trans-
mission” of the content.11
The above statement is the extent of the legal analysis produced by the CRTC
on the technological neutrality of the Broadcasting Act in the 1999 document. The
brevity of this statement stands in sharp contrast to the extensive discussion by the
Supreme Court of Canada about technological neutrality of the Copyright Act, to be
discussed in greater depth below in Part IV.
5 See, for example, Paul Dickinson & Jonathon Ellison, Canadian Social Trends Cata-
logue No 11-008: Plugged into the Internet (1999) online: Statistics Canada
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/kits-trousses/pdf/social/edu04_0118a-eng.pdf> at 2.
6 (Ottawa: CRTC, 17 May 1999) online: CRTC <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/
archive/1999/pb99-84.htm> [Public Notice 1999-84].
7 Broadcasting Act, SC 1991, c 11.
8 Public Notice 1999-84, supra note 6 at para 35.
9 Ibid at paras 41–46. In this section the CRTC states that user-customized content is
excluded from regulation as this content is not created for public consumption, differ-
entiating it from online video. This is further clarified in later CRTC documents where
content is “created by Canadians in their individual capacity.” See footnote in CRTC,
Broadcasting and Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2011-344: Fact Finding exer-
cise on the over-the-top programming in the Canadian broadcasting system, (Ottawa:
CRTC, 25 May 2011) online: CRTC <http://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2011/2011-
344.htm> [Notice 2011-344].
10 Ibid at para 38.
11 Ibid at para 39.
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Despite this determination, in this same 1999 decision the CRTC decided that
OTT would not be subject to regulatory oversight under the Broadcasting Act.
What would become labeled as “the new media exemption order” by the CRTC
was not term dependent but was to be reviewed regularly by the Commission.12
The only suggestion made about a limited time period of application by the CRTC
was that the exemption might end when online services compete directly with tradi-
tional broadcast services, thereby limiting the ability of broadcasters to meet the
objectives of regulation set out in the Broadcasting Act.13 At the time the CRTC
also reviewed the benefits to Canadians of online video including: creating an alter-
native source for information, developing regionally unique programming, and pro-
ducing bilingual content. These benefits were felt to outweigh the need for regula-
tion which would only require new media companies to create similar content.14
Subsequent to the initial 1999 Notice, the CRTC issued an official policy in Public
Notice 1999-197 Exemption order for new media broadcasting undertakings.15
(b) Reconsidering Policy: 2009
The 1999 exemption order was reviewed by the CRTC ten years later in
Broadcasting Regulation Policy 2009-329, Review of broadcasting in new media.16
The 2009 review was initiated because of changes in the new media environment,
as was previously noted by the Commission in the 2006 Report on the Future Envi-
ronment Facing the Canadian Broadcasting System,17 including the growth of
home access to the Internet by Canadians and the availability of higher quality
video online.18
Like the 1999 assessment, in 2009 the Commission determined that the new
media exemption order should remain in place.19 However, reading the 2009 policy
document more closely reveals a heightened awareness by the broadcasting indus-
try about OTT and the threat it might pose to regulated broadcast undertakings.
While parties remained unsure about effect of online video on the broadcast indus-
try in 1999,20 in 2009 technological advances meant that a threat was clearly per-
12 Ibidat para 51.
13 Ibid at para 96. The CRTC notes considerations as to the direct competition between
these services ought to include: the cost of exhibition devices, the general appeal of the
service offerings, customers’ willingness to pay, as well as PC and Internet access pen-
etration rates.
14 Ibid at para 48.
15 CRTC, Public Notice 1999-197: Exemption order for new media broadcasting under-
takings (Ottawa: CRTC, 17 December 1999) online: CRTC <http://crtc.gc.ca/eng/
archive/1999/PB99-197.HTM>.
16 Policy 2009-329, supra note 2.
17 CRTC, Report on the Future Environment Facing the Canadian Broadcasting System
(Ottawa: CRTC, 14 December 2006) online: CRTC <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/
publications/reports/broadcast/rep061214.htm>.
18 Policy 2009-329, supra note 2 at para 9–11.
19 Ibid at para 21.
20 Public Notice 1999-84, supra note 6 at paras 73 and 90.
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ceived.21 Such a threat, parties argue, could cause disruption in traditional televi-
sion broadcasting industry, which might require regulatory intervention to recast
the balance of the system. Here, although not fully defined, parties suggest that
disruption of the system may result in the inability of the privately held television
broadcasters to fulfill the requirements of their license, with a particular emphasis
put on the potential effects on the finances of broadcasters by shifts in viewership
to online video formats. As viewership shifts to online entities, so too might adver-
tising revenues leaving traditional television broadcasters with less income from
which to produce and broadcast Canadian content programming as required under
their terms of license. Although the Commission rejected the notion, stating that
evidence of a real threat to the Canadian broadcasting industry was not clear,22
media organizations were able to successfully insert into the public record recogni-
tion by the Commission that such a threat may be used to assess the need for regu-
lation in future.
The CRTC reaffirmed in 2009 that licensing and regulation of online video
must take place in a manner that furthers the intents of the Broadcasting Act,23 and
highlighted a number of areas for future study and consideration such as: the pro-
motion of Canadian content online, the need for stronger measures to assess the
impact of online video, and the need to develop a national digital strategy.24
(c) Witness to Urgency: 2011
As the 2009 policy review confirmed the intent of the Commission to recon-
sider exemption orders every five years,25 what then led to a reconsideration only
two years later in 2011? In Broadcasting and Telecom Notice of Consultation
CRTC 2011-344,26 the CRTC lays out its intent to respond to the needs of the
Canadian broadcasting industry. With a clear tone of urgency the Commission
summarizes recent changes in the Canadian broadcast environment: programming
from the Internet can be accessed without subscription to cable or satellite televi-
sion services,27 the price points of online video services are increasingly attracting
a Canadian audience,28 new business models for online video providers are becom-
ing successful,29 and concern was expressed by key industry players about devel-
opments in OTT.30 This led the CRTC to state: “there has been increasing evidence
that broadcasting in new media may have an impact on the Canadian broadcasting
21 Policy 2009-329, supra note 2 at para 22.
22 Ibid at para 22: “Based on the record of the Proceeding, the Commission does not
consider that broadcasting in new media currently poses a threat to traditional broad-
casting licensees’ ability to meet their obligations.”
23 Ibid at para 23.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid at para 26.
26 Supra note 9.
27 Ibid at para 3.
28 Ibid at para 4.
29 Ibid at para 5.
30 Ibid at para 8.
292   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [10 C.J.L.T.]
system in the near future.”31 Unlike statements in 1999 and 2009, the Commis-
sion’s Notice 2011-344 did not invoke the need for regulation to fulfill objectives
under the Broadcasting Act, but instead focused on industry concerns in its call for
comments. The tone in 2011 almost takes for granted the threat of online video —
it now seems to be apparent. The Commission’s function seems simply to be to
manage this threat on behalf of the television industry.
It is surprising then that five months later, in the resulting report, the CRTC
concludes, as in 1999 and 2009, that the exemption order for new media should
continue as proponents of a regulatory approach were unable to provide evidence
of how online video was harming traditional broadcasters’ ability to fulfill their
obligations under the Broadcasting Act.32 Instead, the report notes, traditional
broadcasters are engaging with audiences through online video themselves, and on-
line video is providing Canadians with a diversity of programming such as al-
lowing independent producers the ability to reach new audiences.33 Unlike the re-
sultant reports of 1999 and 2009, no mention is made of an actual threat to
Canadian broadcasters by OTT. Instead mentions of change, transformation, and
uncertainty are seen as a challenge to the business models of traditional broadcast-
ers.34 Despite the urgency of tone in Notice 2011-344, the report is much less anx-
ious about the state of Canadian broadcasting in light of actual developments.
However, from 1999 to 2011 statements by the CRTC about the status of reg-
ulation for online video took a decided turn to consider industry perspectives on the
regulatory environment alongside legal and regulatory considerations created by
mandate under the Broadcasting Act. This industry focus may be the result of
greater emphasis by the Commission on industry deregulation and a heightened
importance for coordination with external government bodies to create consistent
regulatory policies or de-regulate where possible.35 Focus on industry worries over
the past 12 years has forced the Commission to become more responsive to indus-
try needs over purely legal or regulatory concerns.
II. SPECULATING ON REGULATION
If regulation of OTT were to take place, what might it look like? Although the
CRTC has never been clear about its vision for the regulation of online video, be-
cause of the nature of online video technology it seems unlikely that regulation
would take place in exactly the same manner as with traditional broadcasters. This
difference is particularly relevant for the provision of Canadian content require-
ments, which, it is assumed, would be part of any regulation of a broadcasting en-
tity as it is a key obligation for broadcasters under the Act.36 As the regulator has
31 Ibid at para 2.
32 Supra note 3 at “Conclusion”.
33 Notice 2011-344, supra note 9.
34 Ibid.
35 See, for example, Competition Bureau, CRTC/Competition Bureau Interface Bulletin
(Ottawa: Competition Bureau, 2001) online: Competition Bureau
<http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/01598.html>.
36 Supra note 7, s 3(1)(d), (e).
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT ON ONLINE VIDEO   293
acknowledged the consumer driven on-demand characteristics of online video,37 it
seems likely that the form of regulatory oversight applied might be borrowed from
the regulation of video on demand (VOD) services that operate on a similar pre-
mise. In a 1997 decision, the CRTC required VOD providers in Canada to fulfill
Canadian content obligations by reserving “shelf space” in their video libraries for
Canadian programming.38 It might be expected that online video providers also
fulfill similar requirements.
Related is the issue of program acquisition and development in Canada. As the
Broadcasting Act requires that all regulated entities contribute to the creation and
presentation of programming,39 it seems likely that financial contributions from on-
line video providers might be necessary. Currently regulated broadcasters pay for
the acquisition of Canadian content programming in order to fulfill this mandate,40
but whether online video providers would be expected to undertake acquisitions in
the same manner, or whether financial contributions would be expected to help
fund the production of Canadian content, remains unclear. Another issue that re-
mains unclear with regard to the potential regulation of online video entities in-
cludes whether requirements would be issued to ensure the provision of services for
disabled persons as required under the Broadcasting Act.41 Regulatory considera-
tion is particularly unclear on how any costs to online media companies might be
borne by consumers, assuming regulatory action were to have associated costs for
compliance.
Perhaps the biggest issue facing the regulator is what types of online entities
might be termed broadcasters as it is not at all apparent what websites might be
subject to the Broadcasting Act. For example, might a website with one video
available be an online broadcaster, or must it be a website where the majority of
content is video? Are websites that have both user generated and professional con-
tent subject to regulatory oversight or not? Of concern is the effect regulation may
have on the development of the online industry, particularly among innovative
firms. This is particularly true where regulation is applied in a manner creating
discrepancies in the legal treatment of seemingly similar internet-based firms.42
Regulation may result in increased monitoring costs, as well as greater editorializ-
ing of content, which can adversely affect innovation by firms in the sector.43
Overall how online video would be regulated by the CRTC remains highly
speculative.
37 Public Notice 1999-84, supra note 6 at para 39.
38 CRTC, Public Notice CRTC 1997-83: Licensing of New Video-On-Demand Program-
ming Undertakings (Ottawa: CRTC, 2 July 1997) online: CRTC
<http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/1997/PB97-83.htm> at para 25. This was done at a
ration of one Canadian program to every ten international programs.
39 Supra note 7, s 3(1)(d).
40 CRTC, Canadian Program Certification, online: CRTC <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/
info_sht/tv11.htm>.
41 Supra note 7, s 3(1)(p).
42 Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 159.
43 Ibid at 160.
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III. ISSUES FOR REGULATING OTT WITHIN THE
BROADCASTING ACT
An important consideration, as evidenced in the above discussion of what reg-
ulation might look like for online video companies, is the application of the Broad-
casting Act itself in an online environment. Although the 1999 policy statement
from the Commission deemed the Broadcasting Act technologically neutral,44 other
considerations such as the nature of the system, the designation of online entities as
broadcasters, and the goals of the Broadcasting Act make it necessary to assess the
applicability of regulation online.
(a) “A single system”
Section 3(2) of the Broadcasting Act states: “It is further declared that the
Canadian broadcasting system constitutes a single system and that the objectives of
the broadcasting policy set out in subsection (1) can best be achieved by providing
for the regulation and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting system by a single
independent public authority.”45 The concept of the single system for online video
is legally and technologically troublesome from a definitional standpoint.
The concept of Canadian broadcasters forming a single system can be traced
back to the Fowler Committee of 1964, who had the task of advising the Trudeau
government on updates to the Broadcasting Act and the future role for the regula-
tor.46 In their final report the Fowler Committee made the argument that despite the
growth of private broadcasters in Canada, there remained a public duty and public
obligations across all broadcasters regardless of their ownership.47 As such, both
private and public broadcasters had public obligations to be fulfilled under their
licenses in the single system for broadcasting.48 Justification for the single system
concept developed because all broadcasters in Canada had to access, and make use
of, the publicly owned spectrum in order to broadcast. The notion of the single
system first set out by the Fowler committee is still evoked today by the CRTC
when discussing the need for consistency of regulation across broadcasting
entities.49
The concept of the single system is much harder to apply to online video.
Because the words of the Broadcasting Act only give authority to the CRTC to
regulate where a service may be deemed to be a broadcast, it is necessary to con-
sider whether the technology upon which OTT is built is the same as that of a
44 Public Notice 1999-84, supra note 6 at para 38.
45 Supra note 7, s 3(2).
46 CRTC, CRTC origins: history and chronology (2008) online: CRTC
<http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/backgrnd/brochures/b19903.htm>.
47 Marc Raboy, Missed Opportunities: The Story of Canada’s Broadcast Policy (Mon-
treal: McGill-Queen’s Publishing, 1990) at 162.
48 Ibid. This notion is reflected in the public nature of spectrum allocation possible under
the licensing regime to be discussed below.
49 See for example: CRTC, Broadcasting Notice of Public Hearing CRTC 2008-11-1 The
role of community broadcasters (Ottawa: CRTC, 22 January, 2008) online: CRTC
<http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2008/n2008-11-1.htm>.
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broadcaster. Not only is the allocation of public spectrum that underlies justifica-
tion for broadcast regulation not present online, another challenge to regulation is
the nature of property that creates Internet connectivity. As author Craig McTag-
gart outlines in his paper “A layered approach to internet legal analysis,” the In-
ternet can be seen as a series of interconnected layers of legacy telecom technology
that create the functionality of the Internet as consumers understand it to operate.50
These layers each have a specific role to produce, operate, and generate the applica-
tions and content carried over the Internet.51 At each layer innumerable companies
own, create tools or operate to support the functionality of systems.52 The nature of
the Internet therefore is fundamentally different than the older monolithic system of
telephony. As McTaggart states: 
For most of the history of the telephone, the user could only use it for one
purpose — voice telephone calls. While it may seem trite, this limitation,
and the structural reasons for it, become significant when contrasted with
the open, layered data networks of the Internet. So long as one company
was in complete control of all aspects of the telephone network, its use was
narrowly defined.53
Like the differences between the Internet and the telecommunications system,
the single system nature of broadcasting is not comparable to the architecture of the
Internet. Because of the nature of the technology supporting OTT services —
where the content, applications and infrastructure of the Internet are interlinked in
terms of its architecture — any regulatory action is much more penetrating across a
variety of providers and technologies than the “single system” concept connotes.
(b) Goals of the Broadcasting Act
The goals of the Broadcasting Act are outlined under “Declarations” in section
3(1)(a)–(t).54 Inconsistencies and contradictions are apparent between many of
these declarations: for example, it is hard to resolve how a broadcast system should
both “encourage the development of Canadian expression by providing a wide
range of programming that reflects Canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas, values and
artistic creativity,”55 while being drawn from a variety of sources including interna-
tional ones.56 Likewise, some of the declarations provide difficulties for the ability
of the regulator to license online video.
Among areas of difficulty are: the need for broadcasters to be Canadian
owned,57 provisions for the broadcast and financial contributions necessary to cre-
50 Craig McTaggart, “A Layered Approach to Internet Legal Analysis,” (2003) 48:4 Mc-
Gill LJ 571.
51 Ibid at 574.
52 Ibid at 574.
53 Ibid at 574-575.
54 Supra note 7, s 3(1)(a)–(t).
55 Ibid, s 3(1)(d)(ii).
56 Ibid, s 3(1)(i)(ii).
57 Ibid, s 3(1)(a).
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ate Canadian content programming,58 the requirement that broadcasts be of a high
standard,59 and all broadcasters under the Act must take responsibility for the pro-
grams they broadcast.60 This latter responsibility is especially difficult for online
video websites that allow individuals to upload their own personal video content.
Consumer-oriented production, whether by individual or professional producers,
and distribution mechanisms intrinsic to these Internet platforms, means that con-
stant monitoring of all contributed content on a worldwide basis is next to impossi-
ble to complete in real-time. Such inaction is not meant to excuse websites from
ignoring offensive or illegal content, but unlike the editorial approach taken with
traditional broadcast media, online media are much more user-oriented so that until
notification of objectionable material occurs little response from website owners
can be expected. Further, the need for Canadian ownership provides an enormous
difficulty for regulation where content is widely available globally through the In-
ternet. In response to Notice 2011-344 a suggestion was made that under Canadian
law Internet sites without physical assets in Canada may be regulated if they have a
substantial connection to Canada;61 however, the ability to establish such a connec-
tion over all websites hosting online video is tenuous. As broadcasting policy has
been described by the Supreme Court, the ownership structure of broadcasters is
essential to the system: “Canadian ownership and control of the broadcasting sys-
tem should be a base premise”.62 The inconsistency with which such a principle
may be applied on a global basis makes regulation potentially inconsistent across
the variety of firms that operate, and may inhibit growth among regulated Canadian
firms in the sector over international competitors.
As was recognized most recently in the 2011 fact-finding report,63 the CRTC
has acknowledged that some aspects of online video also further the goals of the
Broadcasting Act. This includes effects such as: enhancing innovation consistent
with the need for the broadcasting system to be adaptive to technological change,64
increasing the content created by Canadians that is shared through the Internet,65
and increasing the exposure of Canadians to multicultural programming.66 Other
areas where online video seems to be contributing to Canadian broadcast goals in-
clude exposing Canadians to regional and rural issues,67 as well as an increasing
58 Ibid, s 3(1)(e).
59 Ibid, s 3(1)(g).
60 Ibid, s 3(1)(h).
61 See Peter S Grant, Television and Radio Artists, Appendix 4 Joint Submission of AC-
TRA, APFTQ, CMPA, DGC and WGC in response to B/TNOC 2011-344: Enforcement
of CRTC Jurisdiction over Foreign OTT Services, online: ACTRA
<http://www.actra.ca/main/wp-content/uploads/BTNOC-2011-344_OTT_APPENDIX-
4_Peter-Grant.pdf>.
62 Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v Rex, 2002 SCC 42, ¶47.
63 Fact-Finding Results, supra note 3.
64 Broadcasting Act, supra note 7, s 3(1)(d)(iv).
65 Ibid, s 3(1)(e).
66 Ibid, s 3(1)(d)(iii).
67 Ibid, s 3(1)(i)(ii).
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the number of online programs featuring aboriginal Canadians.68 Hence, it is not at
all clear that unregulated online broadcasting is having a detrimental effect on Ca-
nadian content or broadcasting in Canada from the perspective of the availability of
programming.
While the CRTC has declared the Broadcasting Act to be technologically neu-
tral, upon further investigation it is not clear that the declarations of the Act are
applicable to online environments as is made clear in some judicial discussions of
broadcasting and the nature of the internet.
IV. ONLINE VIDEO AND JURISPRUDENCE
(a) Lack of Clarity through Judicial Decisions
Turning to the courts for legal interpretation of the applicability of the Broad-
casting Act to other media, including OTT, is apt to leave a researcher disap-
pointed. Although the ability of the CRTC to regulate online video under the
Broadcasting Act was raised in Reference re Broadcasting Act (2010), the Federal
Court of Appeal refused to answer the question and instead decided the case based
on other considerations.69 Justice Noël, for the court, states: 
To be clear, neither the assumption that “broadcasting” takes place on the
Internet nor the underlying findings made by the CRTC are in issue in this
proceeding with the result that the Court in answering the referred question
cannot be viewed as making any pronouncement with regard to the assump-
tion or any of these findings.70
Therefore, certitude about the authority of the CRTC to regulate online video
in Canada has not been determined at law; however, other Federal Court and Su-
preme Court of Canada decisions can help to draw a line between what may be
called broadcasting and what is not.
(b) Judicial Interpretations Related to Broadcasting
Although the courts in Canada have shied away from directly addressing the
authority of the CRTC to regulate online video, a clear trend historically related to
questions of broadcast law is to consider the technology needed to create a “broad-
cast.” In doing this courts have looked at the transmission and reception of electro-
magnetic waves, or radio waves, to determine whether an entity is a broadcaster
and whether that entity should be regulated at the federal or provincial level of
governance. Here the courts have traditionally used the transboundary nature of
radio waves to reinforce the need for federal jurisdiction over the industry. Only
recently, with the advent of the Internet, have courts started to consider other ele-
ments to define the nature of a broadcaster such as the control of an entity over
programming. In either case, it seems speculative to include online video providers
as inherently subject to CRTC regulatory authority based on these prior decisions.
68 Ibid, s 3(1)(o).
69 Reference re Broadcasting Act, 2010 FCA 178, ¶31–33 [Reference re Broadcasting
Act, FCA].
70 Ibid at para 33.
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(i) Broadcasting and the Importance of Electromagnetic Waves
For the courts, the transmission and reception of electromagnetic radio waves
has come to be a key feature of broadcasting, which has been used to define the
nature of the industry and determine which bodies have regulatory oversight of it.
In a 1931 Supreme Court of Canada decision,71 later affirmed by the Privy Council
in 1932, the court found that the federal government’s authority to regulate radio-
communications could be found because: 
the broadcasting of message in a province or in territory of Canada, has its
effect in making the message receivable as such, and is also effective by
way of interference, not only within the local political area within which the
transmission originates, but beyond, for distances exceeding the limits of a
province, and that, consequently if there is to be harmony or reasonable
measure of utility or success in the service, it is desirable, if not essential,
that the operations should be subject to prudent regulation and control.72
In this case the reception and transmission of radio waves beyond the borders
of any one province, helped define the nature of the broadcast medium as being
extra-provincial requiring federal oversight and regulation of the industry.
The Privy Council further states the provinces’ argument: 
The argument of the Province really depends on making, as already said, a
sharp distinction between the transmitting and the receiving instrument. In
their Lordships’ opinion this cannot be done. Once it is conceded, as it must
be, keeping in view the duties under the convention, that the transmitting
instrument must be so to speak under the control of the Dominion, it follows
in their Lordships’ opinion that the receiving instrument must share its
fate.73
Here the transmission and reception of electromagnetic broadcasting waves
has been used by the Privy Council to define the broadcast medium and to deter-
mine what types of broadcasting activities might be applicable to federal regula-
tion. Constitutionally then, the technology creating broadcasts supported the need
for a federal body to oversee the regulation of the industry.
Likewise in 1978, hearing two constitutional challenges74 about the regulation
of cable companies, the Supreme Court cited the reception of broadcasting signals
by cable companies as key to determining regulatory authority. In this way cable
companies required a similar technology to receive broadcasts sent through electro-
magnetic radio waves which they then redistributed through coax cable wires to
consumers. In Capital Cities, the antennae needed by Rogers Cable TV Limited to
receive signals from the United States helped the court determine that cable televi-
sion was not unlike that of traditional over-the-air television as both required simi-
lar technologies to receive signals, although the redistribution of programming to
71 Regulation & Control of Radio Communication in Canada, Re, [1931] SCR 541 at 546.
72 Regulation & Control of Radio Communication in Canada, Re, [1932] AC 304 [Radio
Reference].
73 Ibid at 314-315.
74 Capital Cities Communications Inc v Canadian Radio-Television &
Telecommunications Commission, [1978] 2 SCR 141 and Dionne v Quebec (Public
Service Board), [1978] 2 SCR 191.
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consumers differed. In Dionne v Quebec (Public Service Board) the need for an
antennae by cable companies in order to receive signals for redistribution to con-
sumers was essential to determining whether an entity should be regulated by the
CRTC.75 Although the court emphasized that it was the service, and not the means
of distribution that must be considered to determine regulatory authority, the court
limited their determination to television broadcasting and not to the wider audio-
visual medium.76 Hence, the need to access and use spectrum for broadcasting sig-
nals has remained a key element justifying government intervention and regulation.
(ii) Broadcasting and Control
In the most recent consideration by the Supreme Court of Canada related to
the Broadcasting Act, the court considered whether an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) may be regulated under the Act when providing an end-user with video con-
tent.77 This was an appeal of the decision by the 2010 Federal Court of Appeal
discussed earlier in this section.78 As the Federal Court of Appeal decided not to
address the question of the CRTC’s authority related to the regulation of online
video, the Supreme Court of Canada also made no findings on this issue. In their
decision, however, the Supreme Court looked instead at the issue of control over
programming as it related to broadcasting and ISPs. Giving weight to the concept
of control was a significant shift away from prior court decisions defining broad-
casts by examining the technology involved to create audio-visual images, as dis-
cussed above, but consistent with other copyright liability findings related to
ISPs.79
In a decision delivered by the court, a finding is made that aspects of broadcast
law and principles do not apply to ISPs because of a lack of control: “There was no
questioning in Capital Cities of the fact that the cable television companies had
control over content. ISPs have not such ability to control the content of program-
ming over the Internet.”80 The Supreme Court, however, does not define control in
this case, but rather, refers to prior decisions about the nature of an ISP as a conduit
to information which cannot be liable for consumer actions as found in Society of
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn of Internet
Providers (CAIP). In their decision control seems to relate to the inability of an ISP
to dictate programming to a consumer so that ISPs act only as a conduit to content
and do not actively control what a consumer might watch.
If the concept of control were to be applied more broadly to broadcast law,
however, this presents an interesting new challenge for determining CRTC author-
ity to regulate OTT. This is because the degree of control that online video provid-
75 Ibid. See also Capital Cities Communications Inc v Canadian Radio-Television &
Telecommunications Commission, supra note 74.
76 Dionne v Quebec (Public Service Board), supra note 74 at 197.
77 Reference re Broadcasting Act, 2012 SCC 4 [Reference re Broadcasting Act, SCC].
78 See supra note 69.
79 See, for example, Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v
Canadian Assn of Internet Providers, [2004] 2 SCR 427, 2004 SCC 45 [CAIP].
80 Reference re Broadcasting Act, supra note 77 at para 9.
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ers have over content viewing is not absolutely clear. Although online video prov-
iders, as the hosts of content online, clearly have capacity over the content, they
seemingly lack real control over what is viewed. This is because of the nature of
the medium where viewers most often chose the content they wish to view, with
little to no editorializing of content into a formalized schedule of programming. In
the world of user generated web content, control becomes all the more diminished
as users create the content that is hosted by the website. These video providers are
often unable to initially review the content before it is posted on a public site,
meaning that their control over what is viewed is greatly reduced.
(iii) What the Courts Say about Online Media
The tenuous links between OTT and traditional broadcasting are made even
more apparent when considering court statements about the nature of the Internet.
Following a series of decisions which first determined that telephone companies
acted as a neutral conduit for the transmission and reception of messages among
users,81 the courts have treated Internet services likewise as a conduit for communi-
cations. This has generally been determined as telecommunications companies and
ISPs do not provide a form of communication that is for the general reception by
the public as broadcasters do.82 Although the full scope of Internet-related court
decisions cannot be summarized here, two significant and recent court decisions
will be noted below.
Consideration of the nature of the Internet has most readily happened in court
proceedings related to Intellectual Property. In ITV Technologies Inc v WIC
Television Ltd,83 a Federal Court of Appeal case considering a dispute over trade
marks, the court recognized that broadcasting and online video are distinct activi-
ties.84 This decision, however, was considered within the context of trademark law
where the nature of the use of a business name was at issue, necessitating drawing
out the differences between different types of activities for specific purposes related
to the trademark. It, therefore, may not be the most apt assessment of technology
for the purposes of defining broadcast entities.
The nature of copyright has also helped define some of the differences be-
tween broadcast and Internet technologies. This was done chiefly in early Supreme
Court decisions in CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada (CCH) and
CAIP. In both cases communications to the public made possible through tele-
phone-based technology were defined and considered. While the technology used
in CCH and in CAIP was different, the Supreme Court applied the neutral conduit
model to the transmission of copyrighted communications.85
The concept of the neutrality of technology is considered in Entertainment
Software Assn v Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada
81 Electric Despatch Co v Bell Telephone Co (1891), 20 SCR 83.
82 CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 SCR 339
[CCH]. Also cited in Reference re Broadcasting Act, FCA, supra note 69 at para 23.
83 2005 FCA 96.
84 Ibid at paras 41–43.
85 See CCH, supra note 82 at para 127 and CAIP, supra note 79 at para 101.
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(2012),86 part of the Supreme Court’s decision in the so-called copyright pentalogy
of cases. Here the technological neutrality of the Copyright Act is emphasized. Jus-
tices Abella and Moldaver for the court state that a “communication” under section
3(1)(f) the Copyright Act87 must be technologically neutral.88
In writing their decision the Supreme Court makes clear that amendments to
the Copyright Act defining the communication of works, related to a performance
right, from “radio communication” to “telecommunication” allowed for an ex-
panded definition. 
In this context the replacement of the words “radio communication” with
“telecommunication” should be understood as merely expanding the means
of communicating a work — that is, from radio waves (“by radio communi-
cation”) to cable and other future technologies (“to the public by telecom-
munication”). In our view, by substituting the word “telecommunication” in
1988 Parliament did not intend to change the fundamental nature of the
communication right, which had for over 50 years been concerned with per-
formance-based activities. Instead, Parliament only changed the means of
transmitting a communication.89
This interpretation by the Supreme Court of Canada may have implications to
the interpretation of the Broadcasting Act; however, its exact effects are not clear.
In their decision the court seems to indicate that the form of the communication is
not important, but it is simply necessary to see that a communication did take place.
An open question then is whether statements such as those above might be used to
interpret the Broadcasting Act as being primarily about any form of audio-visual
communications, regardless of the technology that supports it. Perhaps online video
might be included as a form of broadcasting if “communications” are said to be
technologically neutral? The CRTC itself stated that the Broadcasting Act should
be interpreted in a technologically neutral manner in creating the new media ex-
emption rule.90 Accepting such an interpretation, however, seems to neglect the
intended purpose of the Broadcasting Act and, perhaps, fails to recognize the dif-
ferences between the two Acts.
As the Supreme Court has pointed out in its prior decisions on broadcasting
the technology that supports a broadcasting service is essential to defining this ser-
vice.91 The Broadcasting Act, itself, rests governance over the industry by the
CRTC upon the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves carrying au-
dio or audio-visual content.92 It is, therefore, more difficult to see how the technol-
ogy supporting the medium may be completely ignored with regard to the interpre-
tation of the Broadcasting Act. The Copyright Act is also fundamentally different in
that it is the content by a creator that is being protected in law and not the provision
86 2012 SCC 34 [Entertainment Software Assn].
87 Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42, s 3(1)(f).
88 Entertainment Software Assn, supra note 86 at para 5.
89 Ibid at para 25.
90 See discussion above supra note 11.
91 See, as discussed above, Radio Reference, supra note 72; Capital Cities, supra note 74;
and Public Service Board, supra note 74.
92 Supra note 7, s 3(1)(b).
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of a service as in broadcasting. As is pointed out in the Public Service Board case
noted above, the various systems of provision that create broadcasting entities can-
not be considered exclusively but the nature of the service must also be considered:
“In all these cases, the inquiry must be as to the service that is provided and not
simply as to the means through which it is carried.”93 The nature of the legal con-
cept at issue, therefore, seems to restrict an expanded interpretation of
communication.
V. LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS OF BROADCAST AND
TELECOMMUNICATION REGULATION
At the heart of the 1999 Public Notice by the CRTC is the implication that
regulation is inevitable when OTT services outpace traditional broadcast services.94
Such a justification is the result of the Commission’s interpretation of their duties
under the Broadcasting Act. However, the legal underpinnings of broadcast law, as
discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada, are not found in the “likeness” of ser-
vices, but in the technology supporting the service of broadcasting. Below further
discussion will enhance and draw out the differences between the legal justifica-
tions for regulating the broadcast and telecommunications industries in Canada.
(a) Historic Broadcast Regulation and the Nature of the CRTC’s Legal
Authority
The history of regulating broadcasting in Canada is the history of reactionary
responses to perceived threats. Throughout this history a primary concern has been
ensuring Canadian control and ownership of broadcasters in order for Canadian
content to be produced.95 This was the initial response of the Canadian government
to an influx of broadcasting signals transmitted into Canada during the 1920s from
the United States.96 Such was the concern of the Aird Commission’s Report of the
Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting in 1928, when recommendations were
made to create a Canadian public broadcaster and to create rules to ensure Cana-
dian content would be carried through the broadcast medium.97 In 1958 the Board
of Broadcast Governors was created under the new Broadcasting Act, which would
oversee the regulation of both private and public broadcasters in Canada.98 Later in
1968 the Canadian Radio-television Commission, a forerunner to the CRTC, was
created.99
The legal justification that allows the CRTC to regulate public and private
93 Public Service Board, supra note 74 at 197.
94 Supra note 6 at para 38.
95 Michael Dewing, Publication No 2011-39E — Canadian Broadcasting Policy (Ottawa:
Parliament of Canada, February 2012), online: Library of Parliament Research Publica-
tions <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2011-39-e.htm#a2>.
96 Ibid.
97 John Aird, Report of the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting (Ottawa: Canada,
1928).
98 Dewing, supra note 95.
99 Ibid.
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broadcasters in Canada is the need for government oversight to manage spectrum
through which broadcasts are carried. This idea is vested in the “single system”
approach to regulation discussed above. At its core the federal government has the
ability to regulate broadcasting in Canada under section 91 of the Constitution,
which, although not granting legislative authority directly over the industry, gives
the federal government powers over related industries for communications such as
the postal service, the military, and shipping.100 As communications, like the rail-
ways and the postal service, have a national dimension government management
and oversight is required of spectrum allocations. The idea of the national dimen-
sion of broadcasting was affirmed in Regulation & Control of Radio
Communication in Canada, Re.101 This is also reflected in section 3(1)(b) of the
Broadcasting Act: 
the Canadian broadcasting system, operating primarily in the English and
French languages and comprising public, private and community elements,
makes use of radio frequencies that are public property and provides,
through its programming, a public service essential to the maintenance and
enhancement of national identity and cultural sovereignty.102
An equally important justification, also articulated in American law,103 is that
spectrum is limited. Using basic economic principles it is possible to identify spec-
trum as a good of inelastic supply; price has no effect on the ability to supply the
good, but licensing may provide a controlled approach to access spectrum. Because
of its limited nature, spectrum is defined as a public good, which the government
oversees and manages on behalf of the Canadian people. Historically the legal justi-
fication for the regulation of public goods can be found where some commodities
bring benefits that are greater to a society if distributed more equitably through
management and licensing of private entities by government bodies.104 Such man-
agement is necessary to prevent excessive consumption by private parties.105 His-
torically in the United States, excessive consumption occurred where broadcasters
competed for broadcast frequencies causing disruption to programming.106 Histori-
cally in Canada, broadcasters competing for the attention of Canadians were not
only domestic broadcasters, but American broadcasters as well.107 Inherent in this
100 Constitution Acts, 1867, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 91(5), (7), (10).
101 Supra note 71 and supra note 72. Note further discussion of the significance of this
case occurs above.
102 Supra note 7, s 3(1)(b).
103 See Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1983), at 132; Red Lion Broadcasting Co v FCC, 395 US 367 [Red Lion
Broadcasting].
104 Robert Baldwin & Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and
Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 13.
105 Ibid at 14.
106 See Red Lion Broadcasting for discussion of the effects of excessive consumption and
justification of spectrum management by Federal Radio Commission, supra note 103 at
para 395.
107 Reference re Broadcasting Act, FCA, supra note 69.
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justification are the two related regulatory assumptions: a shortage of spectrum and
an almost unlimited appetite for frequencies by broadcasters making self-regulation
difficult for the industry.108
In Canada the nature of spectrum as a public good is also tied up with a cul-
tural identity, so that the management of spectrum should ensure that Canadian
values are reflected through broadcast programming. By allowing private and pub-
lic broadcasters the privilege to access spectrum via a licensing system, certain reg-
ulatory requirements may be imposed on broadcasters such as obliging them to
show Canadian content. The need for “Canadianness” overrides other public con-
cerns about which parties can access these finite resources as the requirement to
express a national cultural identity is considered reflective of the national public
interest. The secondary nature of freedom of expression in the regulation of broad-
casting is a common feature found in other jurisdictions: among countries with
strong broadcasting policies most do not give citizens the individual right to pro-
duce programming and access the broadcast system due to the limited nature of
spectrum.109 One of the aims of the Broadcasting Act is to overcome this by de-
claring that programming should expose audiences to various ideas and voices
based on regional and cultural identities.110
(b) Regulating Telecommunications
In Canada, as elsewhere, the justification for regulating the telecommunica-
tions industry is fundamentally different than the reason for regulating broadcast-
ing. Yet the history of the impetus and motivation to regulate is similar — fear of
American control. Like broadcasting, fear of American private investment in the
Canadian telecommunications industry prior to the twentieth century pushed gov-
ernment to regulate.111 In particular, a lack of interest among American telecom
operators in serving rural Canada, anti-competitive activity as well as general pric-
ing concerns created the justification for regulation and Canadian ownership of the
industry.112 Creating a monopoly of regional telecommunications companies came
to dominate Canadian policy from 1906 until 1993,113 when international develop-
ments including trade agreements led to the deregulation of the industry and
108 Pool, supra note 103 at 135.
109 Ibid at 108.
110 Supra note 7, s 2(1)(i). Also see CRTC, Broadcasting Public Notice CRTC 2008-4:
Diversity of Voices (Ottawa: CRTC, 15 January, 2008), online: CRTC
<http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2008/pb2008-4.htm>.
111 Monica L Auer, “Foreign Ownership in Canadian Telecommunications” in Marita
Moll & Leslie Regan Shade, eds, The Internet Tree: The State of Telecom Policy in
Canada 3.0 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2011) at 47.
112 Ibid at 47-48.
113 CRTC, Canadian Telecommunications Policy Review Discussion Paper (Ottawa:
CRTC, 17 August 2005), online: CRTC <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/publications/
reports/t_review05.htm> at para 16 [Policy Review Discussion Paper].
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opened telecommunications to greater competition.114
A legal justification for regulation of telecommunications, unlike broadcast-
ing, can be found in the need to guarantee freedom of expression through the me-
dium.115 This concept is reinforced through judicial decisions interpreting the role
of the telecommunications services companies as neutral conduits, who simply fa-
cilitate point-to-point communications. This is established in the Electric Despatch
Co case, noted above.116 Hence, a public interest in governmental oversight
through regulation happens in order to guarantee interconnection with no disruption
of communications.117 This ideal is reflected in section 7 of the Telecommunica-
tions Act,118 which outlines the objectives of the Act including: 
(a) to facilitate the orderly development throughout Canada of a telecommu-
nications system that serves to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the social
and economic fabric of Canada and its regions;
(b) to render reliable and affordable telecommunications services of high
quality accessible to Canadians in both urban and rural areas in all regions
of Canada;
. . .
(e) to promote the use of Canadian transmission facilities for telecommuni-
cations within Canada and between Canada and points outside Canada.119
The need for interconnection meant that, initially, telecommunications in Can-
ada was undertaken as a monopoly service; regulation of services occurred because
of market failures to deliver the necessary scope of services without government
oversight.120 Through time, as deregulation occurred and monopolies gave way to
a more competitive market for communications services, the continuing need for
regulatory oversight has been justified with a view to ensuring the public interest in
interconnection, as well as the reasonable pricing of telecommunications ser-
vices.121 Like broadcasting, however, such a concern about interconnectivity is
also routed in reaffirming “Canadianness” by establishing physical connections
among Canadians through the communications system.
It is important to note the differing principles that have historically provided
justification for regulating for the two industries: while the facility that allows
broadcasting to occur, spectrum, is designated a public good in Canada, the priva-
tization of telecommunications has meant that regulatory oversight of the industry
occurs to ensure the public interest in the connectivity of services. In the case of
regulated wireline telecommunications services there is no public good involved
114 Stephen Clarkson, “Telecoms: From Regional Monopolies to Global Oligopolies” in
Uncle Sam and Us: Globalization, NeoConservatism and the Canadian State (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2002) at 169–185.
115 Pool, supra note 103 at 233.
116 See discussion at supra note 103.
117 Ibid at 19.
118 Telecommunications Act, SC 1993, c 38.
119 Ibid, s 7(a), (b), (e).
120 Baldwin & Cave, supra note 104 at 10.
121 Policy Review Discussion Paper, supra note 112.
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and deregulation has meant that telecommunications facilities are all privately
owned. Such differences become significant when considering the legal justifica-
tions for the CRTC’s ability to regulate online video.
VI. ISSUES FOR REGULATING OTT WITHIN THE LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION FOR BROADCAST REGULATION
Because of the public interest in telecommunications services and the over-
sight necessary to manage spectrum as a public good, regulation of these industries
has been widely accepted in Canada. As regulators begin to exert their authority on
new forms of technologies and communications, the question should be asked as to
whether the legal justifications for regulating old media are present in these new
mediums and, if not, how new justifications for government action may be estab-
lished. Yet, this is a question rarely asked in the public policy debate on OTT in
Canada.122
(a) Spectrum and OTT
The CRTC considers the management of spectrum allocated to broadcasting
as one of its on-going duties. For example, one of the rationales for the switch from
analogue to digital signals for over-the-air broadcasters was the need to compress
analogue signals into digital formats so that spectrum may be used more effi-
ciently.123 The assumption of limited capacities and the need for management,
however, has been suggested as myth-making by some authors who believe it is
only used justify government action in the sector.124 The unevenness with which
entities using spectrum are regulated is perhaps evidence of the myth; while strong
public service obligations are imposed on licensed broadcasters, the wireless mo-
bile industry has had few similar requirements imposed on its industry despite the
use of public spectrum. Yet, as discussed above, despite changes in technology the
need for spectrum has always played a crucial role in determining the ability of the
CRTC to regulate the industry.125
In the digital online world justifying regulatory action based on a shortage of
spectrum seems inappropriate, as the Internet is limited only by the capacity of the
network and not by access to a public good. The limits of broadband networks is an
122 For example no mention of spectrum is made in a 2008 review of new media research
by the CRTC. See, CRTC, Perspectives on Canadian Broadcasting in New Media (Ot-
tawa: CRTC, June 2008), online: CRTC <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/media/
rp080515.htm>.
123 CRTC, “Why has Canada switched to digital television?” Canadian local over-the-air
television stations converted to digital television (Ottawa: CRTC, 31 August 2011),
online: CRTC <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/info_sht/bdt14.htm>.
124 Pool, supra note 103 at 135.
125 See, for example, Dionne v Quebec (Public Service Board), supra note 74 at 197-198.
Also see Capital Cities Communications Inc v Canadian Radio-Television &
Telecommunications Commission, supra note 74. These cases are discussed in detail
above.
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issue widely dealt with in telecommunications regulation, but not broadcasting.126
Although the lack of spectrum necessary for OTT has been acknowledged by the
CRTC,127 this did not inhibit their determination that online video was apt for regu-
lation. Based on a closer reading of the policy documents, it seems that justification
for the regulation of OTT comes from the implied threat to the Canadian broadcast
industry that online video may pose.128 As redefined by the CRTC this threat to the
Canadian broadcast system creates the possibility of regulation in the public inter-
est. Yet, in broadcast law regulation is only justified where there is public interest
in the provision of the public good. With OTT no public good is apparent.
Actions by the CRTC to regulate other Internet protocol-based applications
perhaps provides insight into the regulator’s interest in OTT. An interesting foil to
the debate of OTT is the regulation of peer-to-peer voice applications available
through the Internet from providers such as Skype. In an early decision on how
voice over Internet protocol (VOIP) services would be regulated in Canada, the
CRTC differentiated between VOIP services that functioned like a home telephone
and those that required a computer.129 Any potential similarities that peer-to-peer
voice services through a computer had to traditional landline telephony were dis-
missed and this dismissal formed the basis upon which the Commission undertook
no regulatory action: 
Until recently, generally available voice communication services using IP
only allowed subscribers to make and/or receive calls from a computer and
communications could only take place when all parties to the call used the
same telephony application software. These services, referred to as “peer-to-
peer” (P2P), do not connect to the Public Switched Telephone Network
(PSTN) and do not generally use telephone numbers that conform with the
North American Numbering Plan (NANP).130
Interestingly the CRTC was at least in part incorrect in their assertion that
peer-to-peer applications do not connect to the PSTN, as it is possible to make a
telephone call from a computer-based application to a home telephone.131 Essential
to the CRTC’s decision to regulate some services and not others for the voice mar-
126 For example see CRTC, Telecom Regulatory Policy 2011-703: Billing practices for
wholesale residential high-speed access services (Ottawa: CRTC, 15 November 2011),
online: CRTC <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2011/2011-703.htm>.
127 Public Notice 1999-84, supra note 6 at para 25: “In addition, the Commission consid-
ers that, due to the nature of the networks that comprise the Internet, spectrum scarcity
is not an issue and the development of high bandwidth infrastructure is proceeding at a
relatively rapid pace, although its deployment appears to be proceeding more slowly.”
128 For example, Policy 2009-329, supra note 2 at para 22.
129 CRTC, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2004-2: Regulatory framework for voice commu-
nications services using internet protocol (Ottawa: CRTC, 7 April 2004), online:
CRTC <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2004/pt2004-2.htm>.
130 Ibid at para 3.
131 Although it may not have been possible in 2004, it is possible today to have a tele-
phone number conforming to NANP. For an example see Google, Google Voice —
Features (2011), online: google <http://www.google.com/googlevoice/about.html>.
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ket was the “likeness” of VOIP services to traditional telephony.132
Similar to VOIP services, online video too is subject to a “likeness” test in the
policy documents on OTT in terms of the threat posed by online video providers to
traditional television distribution services.133 Yet, likeness does not form the legal
basis for regulatory action. As the Supreme Court has made clear in its decisions
involving the Broadcasting Act it is instead necessary to look at the nature of the
service provided and the underlying technology upon which that service is based to
assess the applicability of the Broadcasting Act to an entity. Little evidence of such
an assessment by the CRTC can be found in the policy documents.134
(b) The Public Interest, Freedom of Expression and OTT
The other common line of reasoning found among regulators internationally
when they wish to impose regulation on an industry is general concern about the
public interest.135 In doing so the justification for public interest regulation would
include the idea that regulation was necessary to achieve certain publicly desired
results in circumstances where the market would fail to yield these.136 In regulatory
directives and in law, the government of Canada and the CRTC articulate the im-
portance of the public interest for ensuring quality Canadian broadcasting services
as it relates to broadcast distribution undertakings.137 In the US, the ability of the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to create and enforce obscenity, inde-
cency, and profanity standards138 is the public interest in keeping broadcasts free
from the potential of harm to audiences.139 Likewise, for the CRTC to regulate
online video a public interest in doing so might be articulated and form the basis of
regulatory action.
Regulating broadcasting in the public interest has generally been tied to the
management of spectrum:140 because spectrum is a scarcely available, and must be
132 For the full regulatory framework consistent with the 2004 decision see CRTC,
Telecom Decision CRTC 2005-28: Regulatory framework for voice communication ser-
vices using internet protocol (Ottawa: CRTC, 12 May, 2005), online: CRTC
<http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2005/dt2005-28.htm>.
133 Fact-Finding Results, supra note 3. See discussion of OTT forming the basis of re-
placement services for cable, satellite, and IPTV services.
134 The only evidence that can be found is from the 1999 policy decision on New Media,
discussed extensively above, see supra note 11 for further details.
135 For example see Red Lion Broadcasting, supra note 103 at para 380 and EC, Commis-
sion Directive Television Broadcasting Activities, [2007] OJ, Directive 2007/65/EC.
136 Baldwin & Cave, supra note 104 at 19.
137 See Broadcasting Distribution Regulations SOR/1997-555, s 51(3); and Directions to
the CRTC (Direct-to-Home (DTH) Satellite Distribution Undertakings) Order,
SOR/1995-319, preamble: “Whereas it is in the public interest to have DTH distribu-
tion undertakings licensed in Canada as soon as possible [. . .]”
138 Federal Communications Commission, Guide: Obscenity, Indecency and Profanity, on-
line: Federal Communications Commission <http://www.fcc.gov/guides/obscenity-in-
decency-and-profanity>.
139 Red Lion Broadcasting, supra note 103 at para 370.
140 Pool, supra note 103 at 123.
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managed by regulatory oversight, a regulatory body may impose requirements on
broadcasters that are in the public interest.141 In the United States the public inter-
est in maintaining broadcast decorum, as required of regulated licensees, was the
basis of findings in the cases against broadcasters and for regulation by government
in Trinity Methodist Church, South v Federal Radio Commission142 and Red Lion
Broadcasting.143 Although there may appear to be the ability to regulate online
video with a view to the public interest, in doing so the lack of public goods inher-
ent in Internet services creates a legal problem for actions by the regulator.
This is not to say that the public interest is irrelevant to the potential regulation
of the Internet. As discussed above, the public interest in ensuring the interconnec-
tion of communications services became essential to defining the role of the CRTC
with regard to telecommunications. Internationally it is this same public function
that is enshrined in the provision of Internet services. From an international per-
spective the need to guarantee the interconnection of individuals through Internet
services had been tied to state obligations to ensure citizen rights. The United Na-
tions High Commissioner on Human Rights has suggested that access to the In-
ternet should be a human right as the medium allows for the wide dissemination of
expression and users to gain access to this information.144 International concern
about interconnection and rights obligations occurs where governments have cre-
ated laws or regulations that block access by consumers to online data and informa-
tion.145 Concern also occurs where governments create laws governing other areas
of society that have had the unintended effect of limiting access to Internet services
and freedom of expression.146 Among academics the idea of ensuring access to
Internet resources regardless of ISP or regional geography has been called “net-
work neutrality.”147
In Canada the CRTC has acknowledged the importance of network neutrality
in its regulation of broadband services under the Telecommunications Act. In its
decision on the ability of ISPs to manage the data through internal Internet traffic
management policies, the CRTC stated: 
At the core of the debate over “net neutrality” is whether innovation will
continue to come from the edges of networks, without permission. Will
there continue to be rapid and uncontrolled innovation in computer commu-
nications? Will citizens have full access to that innovation? The Commis-
141 Ibid at 125.
142 62 F 2d 850 (DC Cir 1932).
143 Red Lion Broadcasting, supra note 103.
144 Frank LaRue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the
right to freedom of opinion and expression (United Nations General Assembly, Human
Rights Council, 16 May 2011) <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/
docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf> at paras 19–21.
145 WilliamDutton et al, Freedom of Connection — Freedom of Expression (Paris:
UNESCO, 2011).
146 Ibid at 6.
147 Tim Wu, “Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination” 2:1 J (2003) Telecomm &
High Tech L 141.
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sion earnestly hopes so.148
Hence, ensuring interconnection and network neutrality seem to be at the core
of telecommunications policy in the Canadian public interest.
Yet, regulation of online video through the Broadcasting Act could cause un-
intended consequences, such as limiting the access of Canadians to content incon-
sistent with the interconnection mandated under the Telecommunications Act. To
build on an example discussed above, what is the effect on interconnectivity if reg-
ulated online media companies were required to ensure a certain percentage of their
video libraries had Canadian content programming? If this means Canadians are
blocked from accessing all content available through the OTT provider, does this
limit on access contradict the interconnection required under the Telecommunica-
tions Act? It remains unclear as to how OTT services may be regulated in conform-
ity with other broadcast programming in Canada under the guise of public interest,
as the public interest in regulating the telecommunications industry versus the
broadcasting industry are not comparable — this is in part why two different pieces
of legislation govern these industries. The merging of telecommunications and
broadcast into one online format challenge regulatory policy and pose problems for
authority of the regulator to respond.
CONCLUSION
The authority under which the CRTC may regulate online video entities is
unclear when considering the basis of the Commissions’ regulatory and legal
power. As the Telecommunications and Broadcasting Acts defining the powers of
the Commission retain the language of wireline telecommunications and spectrum-
oriented broadcasting, it is difficult for the CRTC to move to respond adequately to
technological change. This is most clear when considering that although the defini-
tions of programming may remain neutral within the Broadcasting Act, these are
neutral only as long as the technology upon which an undertaking broadcasts is
using spectrum. Without this technology, as required under the Act, the CRTC re-
tains no ability as a public authority to issue mandatory broadcasting requirements.
While the CRTC may instead regulate in the general public interest of Canadians,
its ability to do so is questionable, as the public interest in Internet technologies
seems to be ensuring connectivity consistent with telecom principles. In creating
regulations for OTT the regulator may act in a manner inconsistent with the public
interest if these were to affect the Internet freedoms expected by Canadians.
A difficulty this paper points to in the potential regulation of non-traditional
mediums such as the Internet is the interest of the CRTC in regulating based on
threats to an industry, and on the likeness between traditional and new services. It
is also argued that unlike the Copyright Act, the Broadcasting Act regulates a spe-
cific service called broadcasting and not only content, or programming, which
means that it is much more difficult to see the Broadcasting Act as technologically
neutral. Although the Broadcasting Act does give the CRTC the mandate to regu-
148 CRTC, Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2009-657: Review of the Internet traffic
management practices of Internet service providers (Ottawa: CRTC, 21 October 2009),
online: CRTC <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2009/2009-657.htm> at para 4.
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late in a “flexible manner”149 it is not clear that this flexibility provision extends
beyond the industries envisioned and defined under the Broadcasting Act. Tradi-
tional legal justifications for the regulation of broadcasting must clearly be
rethought and the essential elements of the Broadcasting Act giving the CRTC its
power revised if control over online video is wished. As the quote by James Boyle
at the outset of this paper indicates, as new technologies emerge it will be necessary
for society to reconsider basic principles and the regulatory frameworks upon
which the legal treatment of older technologies is based. Without these considera-
tions, assuming the applicability of these legal frameworks to new technologies
may have the unintended effect of inhibiting growth or restricting communications
between individuals in society.
149 Supra note 7, s 5(2).
